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12
Short-Term Net Impact 
Estimates and Rates of Return
Kevin Hollenbeck
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
This chapter contrasts and compares the net impacts of workforce 
development programs estimated in four independent studies done in 
three states. These estimates were computed using a nonexperimental 
methodology in which individuals who had been served by the work-
force system in the state were statistically matched to individuals who 
had encountered the Employment Service. The impetus for these stud-
ies was a commitment on the part of these states to public accountability 
and data-driven performance monitoring and management. 
In three of the studies from which the net impacts that are reported 
here emanate, rates of return have been calculated for the workforce 
development programs that include a full accounting of the opportunity 
costs of participants’ training investments, tax liabilities incurred due to 
increased earnings, as well as changes in earnings-conditioned transfers 
such as unemployment compensation, TANF benefi ts, Food Stamps, 
and Medicaid. 
The contributions of this chapter are fourfold: 1) to compare and 
contrast the net impacts on employment and earnings across four inde-
pendent studies; 2) to show the decomposition of the net impacts into 
employment rates, hours, and wage rates; 3) to present rates of return to 
individuals, states, and society; and 4) to point out policy implications 
of the work. 
The next section of the chapter provides detail about the programs 
that were examined in these studies, the specifi c outcomes for which 
net impact estimates were generated, and the analysis periods. All four 
studies used administrative data from multiple workforce develop-
ment programs, but this chapter focuses on the programs offered by the 
public job training system (administered and funded by WIA and its 
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predecessor JTPA). The succeeding section will present the results of 
the studies for those programs—net impacts and rates of return. Next, 
we discuss briefl y how the net impact and rates of return estimates com-
pare to other studies in the literature. The fi nal section presents some 
policy implications of the work.
PROGRAMS, OUTCOMES, AND TIME PERIODS
This chapter draws from four studies. Each study examined a 
slightly different set of workforce development programs covering dif-
ferent time periods. Table 12.1 displays the various programs and time 
periods. The fi rst two studies, done in Washington, focused on approxi-
mately the same programs: federal job training for adults, dislocated 
workers, and youth; a state-supported program for dislocated workers; 
apprenticeships; and four types of educational programs: adult basic ed-
ucation, high school career and technical education, community college 
job prep, and private career schools. In the second study in Washing-
ton, rehabilitative services programs were added to the scope of work. 
The programs analyzed for the study done in Virginia overlapped these 
programs somewhat: they included the federal job training programs 
for adults, dislocated workers, and youth; community college career 
and technical education; adult education; and rehabilitative services. In 
addition, this study included trade adjustment assistance, welfare-to-
work, and Food Stamp Employment and Training (FSET). In Indiana, 
we estimated the net impacts of the federal job training programs for 
adults, dislocated workers, and youth; community college career and 
technical education; and trade adjustment assistance.
As noted in Table 12.1, the time periods in which the participants 
were in the programs varied across the studies. The studies defi ned par-
ticipation year by when the individual exited from the program. All of 
the studies used the entire universe of program exiters: in 1997–1998 
and 1999–2000 for the fi rst Washington study; in 2001–2002 and 2003–
2004 for the second Washington study; 2004–2005 for the Virginia 
study; and 2005–2006 for Indiana. To be clear, someone who partici-
pated in a program for three years and who exited sometime during 
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1997/1998 1999/2000 2001/2002 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006
Federal Job Training (Adults) 




X X Xa X
Federal Job Training (Youth)  




X X X X
Dislocated Workers                            JTPA III
WIA I-B
X X
X X Xa X
Comm. and Tech. College Worker 
Retraining
X X X X
Secondary Career and Tech Ed. X X X X
Community College Job Prep. X X X X X X
Private Career Schools X X X
Adult Ed./Literacy Xb Xb Xb Xb X
Rehab. Services
Vocational Rehabilitation







Apprenticeships X X X X
Welfare-to-Work  





Trade Adjustment Assistance X X
NOTE: Year of participation is defi ned as year of exit from services. Study 1 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2003) (Washington State); Study 
2 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) (Washington State); Study 3 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2008) (Virginia); and Study 4 is Hollenbeck 
(2009) (Indiana). 
a Combined in this study.
b Adult basic education as delivered by community and technical colleges only.
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1997–1998 is considered to be a 1997–1998 participant, as is someone 
who both entered and exited in 1997–1998.1
In all studies, the net impacts of participation in the workforce de-
velopment programs on employment and earnings were estimated. The 
data came from the quarterly wage record data generated from the UI 
system, and thus are measured over a calendar quarter. In Washington, 
the wage record data include hours worked in a quarter, so for the stud-
ies undertaken for that state, we estimated the net impacts on hours 
worked per quarter and hourly wages. Virginia had an interest in the 
extent to which participants earned credentials either during program 
participation or within a year of exit, so that outcome was analyzed 
in the Virginia study.2 The Indiana study focused on employment and 
earnings as well as posttraining unemployment compensation benefi ts.
The Washington studies also examined the net impact of program 
participation on the receipt of unemployment compensation benefi ts, 
public assistance benefi ts (TANF and Food Stamps), and Medicaid 
enrollment. These data were supplied by the state agencies that admin-
ister those programs. Table 12.2 summarizes the outcomes that were 
examined in the studies. As the table notes, all of the studies focused 
on two outcome time periods: a short-term outcome and a longer-term 
outcome. In Washington, these were 3 full quarters after exit and 8–11 
full quarters after exit in the fi rst study (9–12 full quarters in the second 
study); in Virginia, 2 and 4 full quarters after exit, respectively; and in 
Indiana, 3 and 7 full quarters after exit. 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Net impacts. Table 12.3 provides a summary of the short-term net 
impacts of the programs on employment rates, quarterly hours of em-
ployment, average wage rates, and quarterly average earnings. All of 
the results in the table for studies 1, 2, and 4 are regression-adjusted, 
and all of the outcomes, except for employment, exclude zero values.3 
For the Study 3 results, the employment rates are differences in means 
and the quarterly earnings results are differences in nonzero medians 
between the program participants and matched comparison groups. The 
wage rate and earnings impacts are in 2005$. Note that these results 
up11dbwia0ch12.indd   350 6/23/2011   11:40:11 AM
   351
Table 12.2  Outcomes Examined and Time Periods, by Study
Outcomes Study 1 and Study 2 Study 3 Study 4
Employment Defi ned as > $100 in a
quarter
Defi ned as > $50 in a quarter or 
enrolled in school if < 18
Defi ned as > $100 in a quarter; 
> $50 in a quarter (youth)
Earnings Quarterly earnings totaled across 
all employers
Quarterly earnings totaled across 
all employers
Quarterly earnings totaled 
across all employers
Hours worked per quarter Hours totaled across all employers Not available Not available
Hourly wages Earnings divided by hours worked Not available Not available
Credential completion Not available Credential earned while in 
program or within 12 months 
of exit
Not available
Unemployment compensation Benefi ts of at least $1 in quarter Not available Benefi ts of at least $1 in quarter
TANF/Food Stamp benefi ts Benefi ts received by assistance unit 
that included participant of at least 
$1 in quarter
Not available Not available
Medicaid eligibility State Medicaid administrative data 
indicated participant was “enrollee” 
during at least one day in quarter




3 full quarters after exit
8–11 full quarters after exit in 
Study 1; 9–12 full quarters after exit 
in Study 2
2 full quarters after exit
4 full quarters after exit
3 full quarters after exit
7 full quarters after exit
NOTE: Study 1 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2003) (Washington State); Study 2 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) (Washington State); Study 
3 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2008) (Virginia); and Study 4 is Hollenbeck (2009) (Indiana).
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hours Wage rate ($)b
Quarterly 
earnings ($)b





















   349***
   711***
   146***
   549***






















   66
   62

















   278***
   784***
   410***
NOTE: Study 1 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2003) (Washington State); Study 2 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) (Washington State); Study 
3 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2008) (Virginia); and Study 4 is Hollenbeck (2009) (Indiana). *statistically signifi cant at the 0.10 level; 
**statistically signifi cant at the 0.05 level; ***statistically signifi cant at the 0.01 level.
a Virginia and Indiana wage record data do not include hours so no results for quarterly hours or wage rate.
b In 2005$/2006$.
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include all participants—those individuals who completed their educa-
tion or training and those who left without completing.
In examining the fi rst column of data, one can easily discern that 
most of the programs have statistically signifi cant positive net impacts 
on short-term (3 or 4 quarters after exit) employment rates.4 The levels 
of the impacts are generally in the 5–15 percentage point range. WIA 
seems to be generally successful at getting participants employed. The 
farthest right-hand column of results shows the net impacts on quar-
terly earnings (for individuals with earnings). Whereas the estimates are 
generally positive, there is more variability in the levels and statistical 
signifi cance of the earnings impacts than for employment. For example, 
the Youth program has earnings impacts that are essentially zero, de-
spite reasonably robust employment rate impacts. 
Table 12.4 displays the results for longer-term outcomes. These re-
sults refl ect the extent to which the short-term impacts are retained. The 
results are not substantially different from those in Table 12.3. This sug-
gests that for the most part, the programs’ outcomes do not depreciate 
during the fi rst few years after exit. The programs result in a statisti-
cally signifi cant positive employment net impact, and all of them, save 
federal job training for youth, have statistically signifi cant and positive 
earnings impacts. 
Rates of return. In addition to the net impact analyses, we con-
ducted benefi t-cost analyses for the workforce development programs 
in both Washington studies and in the Indiana study. The benefi ts that 
were calculated included the following:
• increased lifetime earnings (discounted)
• fringe benefi ts associated with those earnings
• taxes on earnings (negative benefi t to participants; benefi t to 
society)
• reductions in UI benefi ts (negative benefi t to participants; ben-
efi t to society)
• reductions in TANF benefi ts (negative benefi t to participants; 
benefi t to society)
• reductions in Food Stamp benefi ts (negative benefi t to partici-
pants; benefi t to society)
• reductions in Medicaid benefi ts (negative benefi t to partici-
pants; benefi t to society).
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hours Wage rate ($)a
Quarterly
earnings ($)a
















   658***
   455***
   463***
















   117
   325***

















   1,009***
   771***
   310***
NOTE: Study 1 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2003) (Washington State); Study 2 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) (Washington State); and 
Study 4 is Hollenbeck (2009). *statistically signifi cant at the 0.10 level, **statistically signifi cant at the 0.05 level, ***statistically sig-
nifi cant at the 0.01 level.
a In 2005$/2006$.
b Data not available.
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The costs included the following:
• forgone earnings (reduced earnings during the period of training)
• tuition payments
• program costs. 
Most of these costs and benefi ts were derived from the net impact 
estimates. The details about how these costs and benefi ts were estimated 
or calculated are in Appendix 12A.
Table 12.5 displays the estimated benefi ts and costs for the JTPA 
and WIA programs analyzed in the two Washington studies and for 
WIA in the Indiana study for the fi rst 10 quarters after program exit and 
for the average working lifetime. The table entries represent fi nancial 
gains (positive benefi ts or negative costs) or costs (negative benefi ts or 
positive costs) for the average participant. The costs and benefi ts are 
shown from three perspectives: 1) for the individual, 2) for the public 
(taxpayers), and 3) for society as a whole. The latter is the sum of the 
fi rst two. The dollar fi gures are in constant 2005$/2006$ and have been 
discounted at 3 percent. 
The top panel shows that the discounted (net) benefi ts to the par-
ticipants over the fi rst 10 quarters after exit are generally in the range 
of $2,800 –$5,000. The costs to participants are fairly negligible for the 
Adult and Youth programs, but they are quite large (in the form of for-
gone earnings) for dislocated workers. Concomitantly, the short-term 
returns on investment for disadvantaged adult and youth participants 
in this time period are quite substantial—they are either positive or in-
calculable because the costs were nonpositive, whereas the return for 
dislocated workers is negative in all of the studies.5  
For the public, benefi ts are generally in the $2,400–$6,000 range 
and are typically less than the public costs of providing services. For 
almost none of the programs is the rate of return for the public positive 
in the fi rst 10 quarters. This suggests that these programs do not fully 
pay off within the fi rst 10 quarters after a participant exits.
Taxes and income-conditioned transfers are transfers between par-
ticipants and the public, so they offset each other in the calculation of 
benefi ts and costs to society as a whole. Thus the benefi ts to society in 
the cost-benefi t analysis are simply the earnings and fringe benefi ts of 
participants, and the costs are the participants’ forgone earnings and the 
fi nancial cost of providing the program services. In the fi rst 10 quarters, 
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Table 12.5  Discounted Benefi ts and Costs and Rates of Return for Federal Job Training Programs over First 2.5 
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PANEL B: Over working lifetime
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NOTE: Study 1 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2003) (Washington State); Study 2 is Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) (Washington State); Study 
4 is Hollenbeck (2009) (Indiana). Table entries are for average participant. Benefi ts include earnings, fringe benefi ts, and income-related 
transfer payments. Costs include tuition and fees (if any), forgone earnings, and public program costs per participant. $ fi gures are in real 
2005$/2006$. — = return on investment (ROI) could not be calculated because of 0 or negative benefi ts or costs.
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the societal benefi ts exceed the costs for the WIA Adult program, but 
not for the Youth or Dislocated Worker programs. 
The lower panel of the table displays estimated benefi ts, costs, and 
return on investments of the average individual served by a program 
through their working lifetime. Here we extrapolated benefi ts from the 
average age of exiters until age 65. For individuals, the discounted (net) 
lifetime benefi ts tend to be substantial, especially in the two Washington 
State studies. The costs (identical to the costs given in Table 12.5) are 
much less than these benefi ts, so the participants’ returns on investment 
range from about 2.5 percent (quarterly) to over 20 percent (quarterly).6 
The benefi ts accruing to the public over the average worker’s lifetime 
are dominated by tax payments on increased earnings. Given that those 
earnings tend to be quite substantial, it is not surprising that the public 
benefi ts tend to exceed the public costs, and there tend to be positive 
returns to the public for the programs. For society, the story is quite 
similar. The benefi ts far exceed the costs, and the returns are therefore 
quite handsome. 
Validity. The net impacts and rates of return presented here are, 
in general, quite substantial. Are they believable? Does participation 
in WIA endow clients with these sorts of returns? One question that 
might be raised is the extent to which the methodological approach is 
responsible for the positive fi ndings. While it is generally agreed that 
a random assignment approach is methodologically superior to the 
matching estimators used in the above-mentioned studies, it should 
be noted that according to the U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce 
(1996), the National JTPA Study (NJS) that used a random assignment 
process resulted in a 13 percent earnings impact for adult men and a 15 
percent earnings impact for adult women. The comparable estimate in 
Table 12.4—an earnings impact of $658 (2005$/2006$) is about a 22 
percent impact (mean quarterly earnings are $2,946 for this group). The 
Washington State results reported here are larger than the NJS, but both 
studies imply quite large returns.
Another issue that might be raised is that the author of this chapter 
is also an author of all of the WIA impact studies cited above. The U.S. 
Department of Labor funded a quasi-experimental evaluation of WIA 
whose results are reported in Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2008). For 
the WIA Adult program, these authors report a signifi cant quarterly 
earnings impact of about $600 for women and $450 for men (2005:1 $). 
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The comparable result reported in Table 12.4 is about $450 for the to-
tal population. For the WIA dislocated worker program, these authors 
report a signifi cant quarterly earnings impact of about $380 for women 
and $220 for men.7 The comparable results reported in Table 12.4 are 
$771 in Washington State and $310 in Indiana for the total population. 
Note that Mueser, Troske, and Gorislavsky (2007) use several quasi-
experimental approaches to estimate the impact of JTPA in the state of 
Missouri, and their preferred specifi cation results in an earnings impact 
of about 14 percent for men and 23 percent for women. All in all, it 
seems like the estimates presented here “fi t” within the literature.
CONCLUSIONS
The contribution of this chapter has been to extend in two directions 
the net impact estimates that have been generated through nonex-
perimental methods with administrative data. In two studies, the net 
earnings impacts were decomposed into employment, hours of work, 
and wage rate impacts. Secondly, the earnings impacts were combined 
with estimates of impacts on fringe benefi ts, tax payments, and income-
conditioned transfers to conduct a benefi t-cost analysis of workforce 
programs.
The policy implications of this work are several in number. First, 
the studies add to the inventory of work that demonstrates that useful 
evaluations of the federal job training programs can be done with ad-
ministrative data. Second, the decomposition of net earnings impacts 
into employment, hours, and wage rates adds rich understanding to the 
variation in these impacts across programs. The rate of return analyses 
demonstrate that the public (i.e., taxpayers) and society as a whole can 
benefi t fi nancially from education and training investments, although 
the payoffs generally take more than 10 quarters to offset the costs.
Finally, the results for individual programs are illuminating. WIA 
services for adults seem to have a signifi cant positive impact on em-
ployment, wage rates, and earnings. However, the analyses point out 
the large forgone earnings of dislocated workers that dampen their fi -
nancial payoff to training. Policymakers may wish to consider stronger 
support mechanisms for these workers such as stipends during training. 
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The usual caveat applies.
1. In the terminology of Imbens and Angrist (1994), the estimates that we have pro-
duced are local average treatment effects (LATE). If we had used entry date to 
defi ne participation (and matched on it rather than exit date), then we would be 
estimating the average treatment effect (ATE). In general, the former are larger 
than the latter.
2. The Virginia study also used the wage record data to develop an outcome variable 
that was used to measure employer satisfaction.
3. The tables in this chapter present results for the entire population. In studies 3 and 
4, we have estimated the net impacts separately by gender as well as for the whole 
population. 
4. The results for Youth are mixed. The two studies in Washington State show posi-
tive and signifi cant employment gain; but neither the Virginia nor Indiana studies 
have this result. In fact, the Virginia employment impact for Youth is negative and 
signifi cant.
5. The exception to this is JTPA II-C (Youth). The net impact estimate of loss of 
TANF benefi ts is quite large for this population in Study 1, and this result “drives” 
the negative benefi ts.
6. Again, two of the returns are not calculable because costs are negative or zero.
7. Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2008) indicate that a difference-in-difference esti-
mate for dislocated workers attenuates these impacts toward zero.
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Methodology for Net Impact
Estimation and Cost-Benefi t Analyses
The net impact evaluation problem may be stated as follows: Individual 
i, who has characteristics Xit, at time t, will be observed to have outcome(s) 
Yit(1) if he or she receives a “treatment,” such as participating in the workforce 
development system and will be observed to have outcome(s) Yit(0) if he or she 
doesn’t participate. The net impact of the treatment for individual i is Yit(1) − 
Yit(0). But, of course, this difference is never observed because an individual 
cannot simultaneously receive and not receive the treatment. 
The time subscript is dropped in the following discussion to simplify the 
notation without loss of generality. Let Wi = 1 if individual i receives the treat-
ment, and Wi = 0 if i does not receive the treatment. Let T represent the data 
set with observations about individuals who receive the treatment for whom 
we have data, and let nT represent the number of individuals with data in T. 
Let U represent the data set with observations about individuals who may be 
similar to individuals who received the treatment for whom we have data, and 
let nU be its sample size. Let C be a subset of U that contains observations that 
“match” those in T, and let nC be its sample size. Names that may be used for 
these three data sets are Treatment sample (T), Comparison sample universe 
(U), and Matched Comparison sample (C).
Receiving the treatment is assumed to be a random event—individuals 
happened to be in the right place at the right time to learn about the program, 
or the individuals may have experienced randomly the eligibility criteria for 
the program—so Wi is a stochastic outcome that can be represented as follows:
(12A.1) Wi = g(Xi , ei ) ,
where ei is a random variable that includes unobserved or unobservable charac-
teristics about individual i as well as a purely random component. 
An assumption made about g() is that 0 < prob(Wi = 1|Xi) < 1. This is 
referred to as the “support” or “overlap” condition, and is necessary so that the 
outcome functions described below are defi ned for all X.1
In general, outcomes are also assumed to be stochastically generated. As 
individuals in the treatment group encounter the treatment, they gain certain 
skills and knowledge and encounter certain networks of individuals. Outcomes 
are assumed to be generated by the following mapping:
361
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(12A.2) Yi(1) = f1(Xi) + e1i 
Individuals not in the treatment group progress through time and also achieve 
certain outcomes according to another stochastic process, as follows:
 
(12A.3) Yi(0) = f0(Xi) + e0i
Let fk(Xi) = E(Yi(k)|Xi), so eki are deviations from expected values that refl ect 
unobserved or unobservable characteristics, for k = 0,1.
As mentioned, the problem is that Yi(1) and Yi(0) are never observed simul-
taneously. What is observed is the following:
 
(12A.4) Yi = (1 − Wi)Yi(0) + WiYi(1)
The expected value for the net impact of the treatment on the sample of indi-
viduals treated: 
 
(12A.5) E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)|X, Wi = 1] = E (ΔY | X, W = 1)
 = E[Y(1)|X, W = 1] − E[Y(0)|X, W = 0] + E[Y(0)|X, W = 0] 
 − E[Y(0)|X, W = 1]
 = 1̂f (X) − 0̂f (X) + BIAS, where
k̂f (X ), k = 1, 0, are the outcome means for the treatment and comparison group 
samples, respectively, and BIAS represents the expected difference in the Y(0) 
outcome between the comparison group (actually observed) and the treatment 
group (the counterfactual). The BIAS term may be called selection bias.
A key assumption that allows estimation of Equation (12A.5) is that Y(0) 
 W|X. This orthogonality assumption states that given X, the outcome (absent 
the treatment), Y(0), is random whether or not the individual is a participant. 
This is equivalent to the assumption that participation in the treatment can be 
explained by X up to a random error term. The assumption is called “uncon-
foundedness,” “conditional independence,” or “selection on observables.” If 
the assumption holds, then the net impact is identifi ed because BIAS goes to 
0, or
(12A.6) E[Δ Y|X, W = 1] = 1̂f (X) − 0̂f (X).
In random assignment, the X and W are uncorrelated through experimental 
control, so the conditional independence assumption holds by design. In any 
other design, the conditional independence is an empirical question. Whether 
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or not the data come from a random assignment experiment, however, because 
the orthogonality assumption holds only asymptotically (or for very large sam-
ples), in practice, it makes sense to regression-adjust Equation (12A.6). 
Various estimation techniques have been suggested in the literature, but 
they may be boiled down to two possibilities: 1) use all of the U set, or 2) 
try to fi nd observations in U that closely match observations in T. Note that 
identifi cation of the treatment effect requires that none of the covariates X in 
the data sets are perfectly correlated with being in T or U. That is, given any 
observation Xi, the probability of being in T or in U is between 0 and 1. Tech-
niques that use all of U are called full sample techniques.2 Techniques that try 
to fi nd matching observations will be called matching techniques. The studies 
reported here used the latter, although Hollenbeck (2004) tests the robustness 
of net impact estimates to a number of matching techniques.
The studies that are discussed here use a nearest-neighbor algorithm us-
ing propensity scores as the distance metric (see Dehejia and Wahba 1995). 
Treatment observations are matched to observations in the comparison sample 
universe with the closest propensity scores. The matching is done with re-
placement and on a one-to-one basis. Matching with replacement reduces the 
“distance” between the treatment and comparison group cases, but it may re-
sult in the use of multiple repetitions of observations, which may artifi cially 
dampen the standard error of the net impact estimator. Finally, a caliper is 
employed to ensure that the distance between the observations that are paired 
is less than some criterion distance. 
For most of the programs analyzed (and identifi ed in Table 12.1), we used 
the public labor exchange data (known as Job Service, Employment Service, or 
Wagner-Peyser data) as the Matched Sample universe (i.e., set U). This is tan-
tamount to the assumption that were these workforce development programs 
unavailable, then the individuals who were served would have gone to the 
public labor exchange for services.3  
The net impacts for the outcomes listed in tables were estimated by 
regression-adjusting levels or difference-in-differences. We generally relied 
on the difference-in-difference estimators except where stark changes in labor 
market experiences were likely to have occurred—for youth and for dislo-
cated workers. The base period for difference-in-difference estimators was for 
quarters −6 to −3 before program registration. The timeline in Figure 12A.1 is 
intended to help explain the analysis periods. The timeline shows the registra-
tion and exit dates for a hypothetical individual of adult age who registered for 
WIA Title I-B in April 2000 (Q2 of 2000) and exited from services in Novem-
ber 2001(Q4 of 2001). The earnings profi le shows that this person had average 
quarterly earnings of $2,500 (real) in the base period (1998:Q4–1999:Q3), 
$2,700 in the 3rd quarter after exit (2002:Q3); and $3,100 average quarterly 
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Figure 12A.1  Timeline and Earnings Profi le for a Hypothetical WIA Title I-B Adult Client
 
- 6 - 5 -4 - 3 - 2 - 1 
Registration 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
exit 
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10 +11 +12 
Analysis period 
Earnings profi le
Calendar quarter 98:Q1 98:Q2 98:Q3 98:Q4 99:Q1 99:Q2 99:Q3 99:Q4 00:Q1 00:Q2 00:Q3 00:Q4
Analysis quarter −9 −8 −7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 Training 
Real earnings ($) 2,300 1,500 0 1,000 2,800 3,000 3,200 3,200 1,600 0 0 1,200
Calendar quarter 01:Q1 01:Q2 01:Q3 01:Q4 02:Q1 02:Q2 02:Q3 02:Q4 03:Q1 03:Q2 03:Q3 03:Q4
Analysis quarter Training  +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8
Real earnings ($) 2,000 0 0 1,500 2,500 2,700 2,700 2,700 2,900 0 1,600 2,900
Calendar quarter 04:Q1 04:Q2 04:Q3 04:Q4 Outcome variables ($)
Earnings (+3)   2,700
Avg. earnings (9−12)  3,100
Base period earnings (−6 through −3) 2,500
Analysis quarter +9 +10 +11 +12
Real earnings ($) 3,000 3,100 3,100 3,200
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earnings in the 9th–12th postexit quarters, which were 2004:Q1–2004:Q4. So 
in the regression adjustment of earnings levels, the dependent variables would 
have been $2,700 and $3,100 for the short-term and longer-term outcomes. In 
the regression adjustment of difference-in-differences, the dependent variables 
would have been $200 and $600, respectively.
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES4
Earnings. Benefi ts and costs are projected for the “average” participant. 
Figure 12A.2 shows the earnings profi les for the average individual in the 
treatment group and in the comparison group. The hypothesis used to con-
struct these profi les is that encountering a workforce development program 
enhances an individual’s skills and productivity (thus increasing wage rates) 
and increases the likelihood of employment. Thus, after the training period, 
the treatment earnings profi le is above the comparison earnings profi le (both 
hourly wage and employment net impacts are positive). During the training 
period, the treatment earnings will be below the comparison earnings, on aver-
age. These are the forgone costs of training in the form of wages that are given 
up by the participant while he or she is receiving training. 
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The theoretical lifetime earnings benefi t is the shaded area in the graph. 
The average comparison group member’s real earnings grow at some fairly 
constant rate (increase in productivity), and the average treatment group mem-
ber’s earnings eventually become higher after training and likely grow faster 
as they accumulate additional human capital in the form of work experience. 
The problem that needs to be solved in estimating the benefi ts is how to 
compute the shaded area. In general, we have several quarters of outcome data, 
so we can get accurate estimates of the area up to the line denoted D12 (treat-
ment minus comparison difference at the 12th quarter). Because the profi les 
represent the average individual, we use the unconditional net earnings im-
pacts to calculate these benefi ts. (They automatically control for employment, 
hourly wage, and hours worked impacts.)
What is unknown (and unknowable) is the shape of the earnings profi les 
into the future after the D12 point. The profi les could continue to move apart 
from each other if the training participants continue to be more and more 
productive relative to the comparison group member, or the profi les eventu-
ally may converge over time if the training effect depreciates. Alternatively, 
the profi les may become parallel to refl ect a scenario in which the training 
participants gain a permanent advantage, but then their productivity growth 
eventually matches the comparison group members. The typical approach is 
to extrapolate earnings into the future based on the observed time trend in 
the fi rst 12 quarters after exit. Since the earnings benefi ts are received by the 
participants in future periods, they need to be discounted. The studies reported 
here used a 3 percent real discount rate.
Fringe benefi ts. With additional earnings, workers will also accrue ad-
ditional fringe benefi ts in the form of paid leave, paid insurances, retirement/
savings plan contributions, and other noncash benefi ts. Two sources of data 
provided estimates of the ratio of fringe benefi ts (defi ned as paid leave plus 
paid insurances plus retirement plan contributions plus other) to gross wages 
and salaries (including supplemental pay such as overtime). The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2002), reports this ratio to be 23.3 percent for “All U.S.” and 
20.4 percent for the “West Census Region.” The U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
(2001) reports a ratio of 24.3 percent for the Pacifi c region. Under the assump-
tion that workforce development program participants are less likely to get 
fringe benefi t coverage than the average worker, and to be conservative in our 
benefi t estimation, we used the assumption that this ratio would be 20 percent 
(applied to the discounted annual earnings increments).
Tax payments. Higher earnings will lead to payment of increased payroll, 
sales/excise, local, state, and federal income taxes.5 The increased taxes are 
a cost to participants and a benefi t to the public. We used average (marginal) 
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tax rates for each of the taxes and applied these rates to the annual earnings 
changes. For example, we used the current rate of 7.65 percent to estimate the 
future payroll tax liabilities. We relied on IRS data for the federal income tax 
rates that factor in earned income tax credits, and state sources provided aver-
age rates for the other types of taxes. 
Unemployment compensation. Unemployment compensation benefi ts in 
the future may increase for participants if programs increase employment (and 
therefore the probability of receiving UI) or increase earnings (and therefore 
benefi ts) or they may decrease if programs decrease the likelihood of unem-
ployment or decrease duration of unemployment spells. Increased UI benefi ts 
in the future would be a discounted benefi t to participants and cost to the pub-
lic. We used a similar empirical strategy as we did for lifetime earnings to 
interpolate and extrapolate these benefi ts. In particular, we estimated the un-
conditional UI benefi t net impacts for the fi rst 12 quarters after exit and used 
these estimates as the average impact for the program in those quarters. Then 
we used the estimate for the 12th quarter after exit to extrapolate for 28 more 
quarters (68 quarters for WIA Youth). In other words, we assumed that the UI 
benefi t gain or loss would dampen to 0 after 10 years for the Adult and Dislo-
cated Worker programs and after 20 years for the Youth program. 
Income-conditioned transfers. The maintained hypothesis was that 
participation in the workforce development programs would decrease the prob-
ability of receiving TANF and Food Stamps, and the probability of enrolling 
in Medicaid. In addition, increased earnings may have resulted in reductions 
in benefi t levels for TANF and Food Stamps. Finally, if individuals no longer 
receive TANF or Food Stamps, they would not receive any support services 
such as child care or other referrals.
For TANF/Food Stamps, we followed the same empirical strategy as 
we did for unemployment compensation. We estimated net impacts for un-
conditional TANF benefi ts and Food Stamp benefi ts for the 12 quarters after 
program exit cohort and extrapolated beyond that period using the estimate 
from quarter +12. We again assumed that on average, the program participants 
may receive these benefi ts (or lose these benefi ts) for up to 40 quarters (or 
80 quarters for the youth program) even though TANF is time limited to 20 
quarters. The reason for going beyond 20 quarters is that these are averages for 
the entire program group, and the dynamics of recipiency will be assumed to 
continue for up to 10 years.
The typical pattern for the workforce development programs is that in the 
short term, TANF benefi ts are decreased for participants who exit because, for 
the most part, employment rates increase—at least, some individuals leave the 
rolls. However, as time progresses, some workers begin to lose employment, 
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or become single and have dependent children, and the group’s TANF net im-
pact benefi ts become positive, although of relatively small magnitude. 
We followed a similar empirical strategy for Food Stamps as we did for 
TANF. We estimated net impacts for unconditional benefi ts for the 12 quarters 
after program exit and extrapolated beyond that period using the estimate from 
quarter +12. We again assumed that on average, the program participants may 
receive these benefi ts (or lose these benefi ts) for up to 40 quarters (or 80 quar-
ters for the Youth program). 
The states did not make actual benefi t/usage information for Medicaid 
available, so we estimated net impacts of actually being enrolled in Medicaid. 
Our hypothesis was that training participants will tend to decrease their enroll-
ment rates as they become better attached to the labor force over time and will 
thus lose eligibility. We converted Medicaid enrollment into fi nancial terms 
by multiplying the average state share of Medicaid expenditures per quarter 
times the average number of household members per case. As with TANF and 
Food Stamps, this is a benefi t to the participant and a cost to the public. To 
interpolate/extrapolate the net impact of a program on Medicaid eligibility, we 
either averaged or fi t a linear equation time series of estimated enrollment net 
impacts. 
Costs. Two types of costs were estimated for each of the programs. The 
fi rst was forgone earnings, which would be reduced earnings while the partici-
pants were actually engaged in the training programs. The second type of cost 
was the actual direct costs of the training. 
Forgone earnings represent the difference between what workforce devel-
opment program participants would have earned if they had not participated 
in a program (which is unobservable) and what they earned while they did 
participate. The natural estimate for the former is the earnings of the matched 
comparison group members during the length of training. Specifi cally, we used 
Equation (12A.7) to estimate mechanistically the forgone earnings. Note that 
we did not discount forgone earnings, but did calculate them in real $. 
(12A.7) Forgonei  1 1 0ˆ0.5 i i i iE E E d         , 
where 1 0,E E = average quarterly earnings (unconditional) for treatment group 
            in quarter –1 and during training period, respectively.
 1Ê = average quarterly earnings in fi rst postexit period for matched        comparison group.
  d = average training duration.
   i = indexes program.
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For the most part, the costs of providing services were supplied to us by 
the states. Staff members of the state agencies calculated these costs from ad-
ministrative data on days in the program and daily cost information. 
Appendix Notes
1. Note that Imbens (2004) shows that this condition can be slightly weakened to 
Pr(Wi = 1|Xi) < 1.
2. Some of these techniques trim or delete a few outlier observations from U but will 
still be referred to as full sample techniques.
3. For some of the programs other than the public job training programs focused on 
here, the public labor exchange was not an appropriate counterfactual, and alterna-
tive administrative data sources were used. These programs included secondary 
career and technical education, vocational rehabilitation, and blind and visually 
impaired services. For high school career and technical education, the matched 
comparison universe was all high school graduates in the state. For the other 
two programs, the matched comparison universe was composed of nonserved 
applicants. 
4. This discussion will present general methodological issues. Readers can fi nd the 
specifi c parameters or estimates that were used in the source reports.
5. Washington does not have local or state income taxes.
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